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Abstract
Many applications of Bayesian data analysis involve sensitive information, motivating meth-
ods which ensure that privacy is protected. We introduce a general privacy-preserving
framework for Variational Bayes (VB), a widely used optimization-based Bayesian in-
ference method. Our framework respects differential privacy, the gold-standard privacy
criterion, and encompasses a large class of probabilistic models, called the Conjugate Expo-
nential (CE) family. We observe that we can straightforwardly privatise VB’s approximate
posterior distributions for models in the CE family, by perturbing the expected sufficient
statistics of the complete-data likelihood. For a broadly-used class of non-CE models, those
with binomial likelihoods, we show how to bring such models into the CE family, such that
inferences in the modified model resemble the private variational Bayes algorithm as closely
as possible, using the Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation scheme. The iterative nature of
variational Bayes presents a further challenge since iterations increase the amount of noise
needed. We overcome this by combining: (1) an improved composition method for differ-
ential privacy, called the moments accountant, which provides a tight bound on the privacy
cost of multiple VB iterations and thus significantly decreases the amount of additive noise;
and (2) the privacy amplification effect of subsampling mini-batches from large-scale data
in stochastic learning. We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in CE
and non-CE models including latent Dirichlet allocation, Bayesian logistic regression, and
sigmoid belief networks, evaluated on real-world datasets.
Keywords: Variational Bayes, differential privacy, moments accountant, conjugate ex-
ponential family, Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation.
1. Introduction
Bayesian inference, which reasons over the uncertainty in model parameters and latent vari-
ables given data and prior knowledge, has found widespread use in data science application
domains in which privacy is essential, including text analysis (Blei et al., 2003), medical
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informatics (Husmeier et al., 2006), and MOOCS (Piech et al., 2013). In these applica-
tions, the goals of the analysis must be carefully balanced against the privacy concerns
of the individuals whose data are being studied (Daries et al., 2014). The recently pro-
posed Differential Privacy (DP) formalism provides a means for analyzing and controlling
this trade-off, by quantifying the privacy “cost” of data-driven algorithms (Dwork et al.,
2006b). In this work, we address the challenge of performing Bayesian inference in private
settings, by developing an extension of the widely used Variational Bayes (VB) algorithm
that preserves differential privacy. We provide extensive experiments across a variety of
probabilistic models which demonstrate that our algorithm is a practical, broadly applica-
ble, and statistically efficient method for privacy-preserving Bayesian inference.
The algorithm that we build upon, variational Bayes, is an optimisation-based approach
to Bayesian inference which has origins in the closely related Expectation Maximisation
(EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977), although there are important differences between
these methods. Variational Bayes outputs an approximation to the full Bayesian posterior
distribution, while expectation maximisation performs maximum likelihood and MAP es-
timation, and hence outputs a point estimate of the parameters. Thus, VB performs fully
Bayesian inference approximately, while EM does not. It will nevertheless be convenient to
frame our discussion on VB in the context of EM, following Beal (2003). The EM algorithm
seeks to learn the parameters of models with latent variables. Since directly optimising the
log likelihood of observations under such models is intractable, EM introduces a lower bound
on the log likelihood by rewriting it in terms of auxiliary probability distributions over the
latent variables, and using a Jensen’s inequality argument. EM proceeds by iteratively alter-
nating between improving the bound via updating the auxiliary distributions (the E-step),
and optimising the lower bound with respect to the parameters (the M-step).
Alternatively, EM can instead be understood as an instance of the variational method, in
which both the E- and M-steps are viewed as maximising the same joint objective function:
a reinterpretation of the bound as a variational lower bound which is related to a quantity
known as the variational free energy in statistical physics, and to the KL-divergence (Neal
and Hinton, 1998). This interpretation opens the door to extensions in which simplifying as-
sumptions are made on the optimization problem, thereby trading improved computational
tractability against tightness of the bound. Such simplifications, for instance assuming that
the auxiliary distributions are fully factorized, make feasible a fully Bayesian extension of
EM, called Variational Bayesian EM (VBEM) (Beal, 2003). While VBEM has a somewhat
similar algorithmic structure to EM, it aims to compute a fundamentally different object:
an approximation to the entire posterior distribution, instead of a point estimate of the
parameters. VBEM thereby provides an optimisation-based alternative to Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation methods for Bayesian inference, and as such, frequently
has faster convergence properties than corresponding MCMC methods. We collectively refer
to VBEM and an intermediary method between it and EM, called Variational EM (VEM),
as variational Bayes.1
While the variational Bayes algorithm proves its usefulness by successfully solving many
statistical problems, the standard form of the algorithm unfortunately cannot guarantee
1. Variational EM uses simplifying assumptions on the auxiliary distribution over latent variables, as in
VBEM, but still aims to find a point estimate of the parameters, as in EM. See Sec. 2.5 for more details
on variational Bayes, and Appendix D for more details on EM.
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privacy for each individual in the dataset. Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006b)
is a formalism which can be used to establish such guarantees. An algorithm is said to
preserve differential privacy if its output is sufficiently noisy or random to obscure the
participation of any single individual in the data. By showing that an algorithm satisfies
the differential privacy criterion, we are guaranteed that an adversary cannot draw new
conclusions about an individual from the output of the algorithm, by virtue of his/her
participation in the dataset. However, the injection of noise into an algorithm, in order
to satisfy the DP definition, generally results in a loss of statistical efficiency, as measured
by accuracy per sample in the dataset. To design practical differentially private machine
learning algorithms, the central challenge is to design a noise injection mechanism such that
there is a good trade-off between privacy and statistical efficiency.
Iterative algorithms such as variational Bayes pose a further challenge, when developing
a differentially private algorithm: each iteration corresponds to a query to the database
which must be privatised, and the number of iterations required to guarantee accurate
posterior estimates causes high cumulative privacy loss. To compensate for the loss, one
needs to add a significantly high level of noise to the quantity of interest. We overcome
these challenges in the context of variational Bayes by using the following key ideas:
• Perturbation of the expected sufficient statistics: Our first observation is that
when models are in the Conjugate Exponential (CE) family, we can privatise varia-
tional posterior distributions simply by perturbing the expected sufficient statistics of
the complete-data likelihood. This allows us to make effective use of the per iteration
privacy budget in each step of the algorithm.
• Refined composition analysis: In order to use the privacy budget more effectively
across many iterations, we calculate the cumulative privacy cost by using an improved
composition analysis, the Moments Accountant (MA) method of Abadi et al. (2016).
This method maintains a bound on the log of the moment generating function of
the privacy loss incurred by applying multiple mechanisms to the dataset, i.e. one
mechanism for each iteration of a machine learning algorithm. This allows for a higher
per-iteration budget than standard methods.
• Privacy amplification effect from subsampling of large-scale data: Processing
the entire dataset in each iteration is extremely expensive in the big data setting, and
is not possible in the case of streaming data, for which the size of the dataset is
assumed to be infinite. Stochastic learning algorithms provide a scalable alternative
by performing parameter updates based on subsampled mini-batches of data, and this
has proved to be highly advantageous for large-scale applications of variational Bayes
(Hoffman et al., 2013). This subsampling procedure, in fact, has a further benefit
of amplifying privacy. Our results confirm that subsampling works synergistically
in concert with moments accountant composition to make effective use of an overall
privacy budget. While there are several prior works on differentially private algorithms
in stochastic learning (e.g. Bassily et al. (2014); Song et al. (2013); Wang et al.
(2015); Wang et al. (2016); Wu et al. (2016)), the use of privacy amplification due
to subsampling, together with MA composition, has not been used in the context of
variational Bayes before (Abadi et al. (2016) used this approach for privacy-preserving
deep learning).
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• Data augmentation for the non-CE family models: For widely used non-CE
models with binomial likelihoods such as logistic regression, we exploit the Po´lya-
Gamma data augmentation scheme (Polson et al., 2013) to bring such models into the
CE family, such that inferences in the modified model resemble our private variational
Bayes algorithm as closely as possible. Unlike recent work which involves perturbing
and clipping gradients for privacy (Ja¨lko¨ et al., 2017), our method uses an improved
composition method, and also maintains the closed-form updates for the variational
posteriors and the posterior over hyper-parameters, and results in an algorithm which
is more faithful to the standard CE variational Bayes method. Several papers have
used the Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation method in order to perform Bayesian
inference, either exactly via Gibbs sampling (Polson et al., 2013), or approximately
via variational Bayes (Gan et al., 2015). However, this augmentation technique has
not previously been used in the context of differential privacy.
Taken together, these ideas result in an algorithm for privacy-preserving variational
Bayesian inference that is both practical and broadly applicable. Our private VB algorithm
makes effective use of the privacy budget, both per iteration and across multiple iterations,
and with further improvements in the stochastic variational inference setting. Our algorithm
is also general, and applies to the broad class of CE family models, as well as non-CE models
with binomial likelihoods. We present extensive empirical results demonstrating that our
algorithm can preserve differential privacy while maintaining a high degree of statistical
efficiency, leading to practical private Bayesian inference on a range of probabilistic models.
We organise the remainder of this paper as follows. First, we review relevant background
information on differential privacy, privacy-preserving Bayesian inference, and variational
Bayes in Sec. 2. We then introduce our novel general framework of private variational Bayes
in Sec. 3 and illustrate how to apply that general framework to the latent Dirichlet allocation
model in Sec. 4. In Sec. 5, we introduce the Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation scheme for
non-CE family models, and we then illustrate how to apply our private variational Bayes
algorithm to Bayesian logistic regression (Sec. 6) and sigmoid belief networks (Sec. 7).
Lastly, we summarise our paper and provide future directions in Sec. 8.
2. Background
We begin with some background information on differential privacy, general techniques for
designing differentially private algorithms and the composition techniques that we use. We
then provide related work on privacy-preserving Bayesian inference, as well as the general
formulation of the variational inference algorithm.
2.1 Differential privacy
Differential Privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis
algorithms (Dwork and Roth, 2014; Dwork et al., 2006b).
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy) A randomized algorithm M(X) is said to be (, δ)-
differentially private if
Pr(M(X) ∈ S) ≤ exp()Pr(M(X′) ∈ S) + δ (1)
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for all measurable subsets S of the range of M and for all datasets X, X′ differing by a
single entry (either by excluding that entry or replacing it with a new entry).
Here, an entry usually corresponds to a single individual’s private value. If δ = 0, the
algorithm is said to be -differentially private, and if δ > 0, it is said to be approximately
differentially private.
Intuitively, the definition states that the probability of any event does not change very
much when a single individual’s data is modified, thereby limiting the amount of information
that the algorithm reveals about any one individual. We observe that M is a randomized
algorithm, and randomization is achieved by either adding external noise, or by subsampling.
In this paper, we use the “include/exclude” version of Def. 1, in which differing by a single
entry refers to the inclusion or exclusion of that entry in the dataset.2
2.2 Designing differentially private algorithms
There are several standard approaches for designing differentially-private algorithms –
see Dwork and Roth (2014) and Sarwate and Chaudhuri (2013) for surveys. The classi-
cal approach is output perturbation by Dwork et al. (2006b), where the idea is to add noise
to the output of a function computed on sensitive data. The most common form of output
perturbation is the global sensitivity method by Dwork et al. (2006b), where the idea is to
calibrate the noise added to the global sensitivity of the function.
2.2.1 The Global Sensitivity Mechanism
The global sensitivity of a function F of a dataset X is defined as the maximum amount
(over all datasets X) by which F changes when the private value of a single individual in
X changes. Specifically,
∆F = max
|X−X′|=1
|F (X)− F (X′)|,
where X is allowed to vary over the entire data domain, and |F (·)| can correspond to either
the L1 norm or the L2 norm of the function, depending on the noise mechanism used.
In this paper, we consider a specific form of the global sensitivity method, called the
Gaussian mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006a), where Gaussian noise calibrated to the global
sensitivity in the L2 norm is added. Specifically, for a function F with global sensitivity
∆F , we output:
F (X) + Z, where Z ∼ N(0, σ2) , σ2 ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ)(∆F )2/2 ,
and where ∆F is computed using the L2 norm, and is referred to as the L2 sensitivity of
the function F . The privacy properties of this method are illustrated in (Dwork and Roth,
2014; Bun and Steinke, 2016; Dwork and Rothblum, 2016).
2. We use this version of differential privacy in order to make use of Abadi et al. (2016)’s analysis of the
“privacy amplification” effect of subsampling in the specific case of MA using the Gaussian mechanism.
Privacy amplification is also possible with the “replace-one” definition of DP, cf. Wang et al. (2016).
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2.2.2 Other Mechanisms
A variation of the global sensitivity method is the smoothed sensitivity method (Nissim et al.,
2007), where the standard deviation of the added noise depends on the dataset itself, and
is less when the dataset is well-behaved. Computing the smoothed sensitivity in a tractable
manner is a major challenge, and efficient computational procedures are known only for a
small number of relatively simple tasks.
A second, different approach is the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007),
a generic procedure for privately solving an optimisation problem where the objective de-
pends on sensitive data. The exponential mechanism outputs a sample drawn from a density
concentrated around the (non-private) optimal value; this method too is computationally
inefficient for large domains. A third approach is objective perturbation (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011), where an optimisation problem is perturbed by adding a (randomly drawn) term
and its solution is output; while this method applies easily to convex optimisation problems
such as those that arise in logistic regression and SVM, it is unclear how to apply it to more
complex optimisation problems that arise in Bayesian inference.
A final approach for designing differentially private algorithms is sample-and-aggregate
(Nissim et al., 2007), where the goal is to boost the amount of privacy offered by running
private algorithms on subsamples, and then aggregating the result. In this paper, we use a
combination of output perturbation along with sample-and-aggregate.
2.3 Composition
An important property of differential privacy which makes it conducive to real applications
is composition, which means that the privacy guarantees decay gracefully as the same private
dataset is used in multiple releases. This property allows us to easily design private versions
of iterative algorithms by making each iteration private, and then accounting for the privacy
loss incurred by a fixed number of iterations.
The first composition result was established by Dwork et al. (2006b) and Dwork et al.
(2006a), who showed that differential privacy composes linearly; if we use differentially pri-
vate algorithms A1, . . . , Ak with privacy parameters (1, δ1), . . . , (k, δk) then the resulting
process is (
∑
k k,
∑
k δk)-differentially private. This result was improved by Dwork et al.
(2010) to provide a better rate for (, δ)-differential privacy. Kairouz et al. (2017) improves
this even further, and provides a characterization of optimal composition for any differ-
entially private algorithm. Bun and Steinke (2016) uses these ideas to provide simpler
composition results for differentially mechanisms that obey certain properties.
2.3.1 The Moments Accountant Method
In this paper, we use the Moments Accountant (MA) composition method due to Abadi
et al. (2016) for accounting for privacy loss incurred by successive iterations of an iterative
mechanism. We choose this method as it is tighter than Dwork et al. (2010), and applies
more generally than zCDP composition (Bun and Steinke, 2016). Moreover, unlike the result
in Kairouz et al. (2017), this method is tailored to specific algorithms, and has relatively
simple forms, which makes calculations easy.
The moments accountant method is based on the concept of a privacy loss random
variable, which allows us to consider the entire spectrum of likelihood ratios Pr(M(X)=o)Pr(M(X′)=o)
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induced by a privacy mechanism M. Specifically, the privacy loss random variable corre-
sponding to a mechanismM, datasets X and X′, and an auxiliary parameter w is a random
variable defined as follows:
LM(X,X′, w) := log
Pr(M(X, w) = o)
Pr(M(X′, w) = o) , with likelihood Pr(M(X, w) = o),
where o lies in the range of M. Observe that if M is (, 0)-differentially private, then
the absolute value of LM(X,X′, w) is at most  with probability 1.
The moments accountant method exploits properties of this privacy loss random variable
to account for the privacy loss incurred by applying mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mt successively
to a dataset X; this is done by bounding properties of the log of the moment generating
function of the privacy loss random variable. Specifically, the log moment function αMt of
a mechanism Mt is defined as:
αMt(λ) = sup
X,X′,w
logE[exp(λLMt(X,X′, w))], (2)
where X and X′ are datasets that differ in the private value of a single person.3 Abadi
et al. (2016) shows that if M is the combination of mechanisms (M1, . . . ,Mk) where each
mechanism addes independent noise, then, its log moment generating function αM has the
property that:
αM(λ) ≤
k∑
t=1
αMt(λ) (3)
Additionally, given a log moment function αM, the corresponding mechanism M satisfies
a range of privacy parameters (, δ) connected by the following equation:
δ = min
λ
exp(αM(λ)− λ) (4)
These properties immediately suggest a procedure for tracking privacy loss incurred
by a combination of mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mk on a dataset. For each mechanism Mt,
first compute the log moment function αMt ; for simple mechanisms such as the Gaussian
mechanism this can be done by simple algebra. Next, compute αM for the combination
M = (M1, . . . ,Mk) from (3), and finally, recover the privacy parameters of M using (4)
by either finding the best  for a target δ or the best δ for a target . In some special cases
such as composition of k Gaussian mechanisms, the log moment functions can be calculated
in closed form; the more common case is when closed forms are not available, and then a
grid search may be performed over λ. We observe that any (, δ) obtained as a solution
to (4) via grid search are still valid privacy parameters, although they may be suboptimal
if the grid is too coarse.
2.4 Privacy-preserving Bayesian inference
Privacy-preserving Bayesian inference is a new research area which is currently receiving
a lot of attention. Dimitrakakis et al. (2014) showed that Bayesian posterior sampling is
3. In this paper, we will interchangeably denote expectations as E[·] or 〈·〉.
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automatically differentially private, under a mild sensitivity condition on the log likelihood.
This result was independently discovered by Wang et al. (2015), who also showed that the
Stochastic Gradient Langevin Dynamics (SGLD) Bayesian inference algorithm (Welling
and Teh, 2011) automatically satisfies approximate differential privacy, due to the use of
Gaussian noise in the updates.
As an alternative to obtaining privacy “for free” from posterior sampling, Foulds et al.
(2016) studied a Laplace mechanism approach for exponential family models, and proved
that it is asymptotically efficient, unlike the former approach. Independently of this work,
Zhang et al. (2016) proposed an equivalent Laplace mechanism method for private Bayesian
inference in the special case of beta-Bernoulli systems, including graphical models con-
structed based on these systems. Foulds et al. (2016) further analyzed privacy-preserving
MCMC algorithms, via both exponential and Laplace mechanism approaches.
In terms of approximate Bayesian inference, Ja¨lko¨ et al. (2017) recently considered
privacy-preserving variational Bayes via perturbing and clipping the gradients of the vari-
ational lower bound. However, this work focuses its experiments on logistic regression, a
model that does not have latent variables. Given that most latent variable models consist of
at least as many latent variables as the number of datapoints, the long vector of gradients
(the concatenation of the gradients with respect to the latent variables; and with respect to
the model parameters) in such cases is expected to typically require excessive amounts of
additive noise. Furthermore, our approach, using the data augmentation scheme (see Sec.
5) and moment perturbation, yields closed-form posterior updates (posterior distributions
both for latent variables and model parameters) that are closer to the spirit of the orig-
inal variational Bayes method, for both CE and non-CE models, as well as an improved
composition analysis using moments accountant.
In recent work, Barthe et al. (2016) designed a probabilistic programming language for
designing privacy-preserving Bayesian machine learning algorithms, with privacy achieved
via input or output perturbation, using standard mechanisms.
Lastly, although it is not a fully Bayesian method, it is worth noting the differentially
private expectation maximisation algorithm developed by Park et al. (2017), which also
involves perturbing the expected sufficient statistics for the complete-data likelihood. The
major difference between our and their work is that EM is not (fully) Bayesian, i.e., EM
outputs the point estimates of the model parameters; while VB outputs the posterior dis-
tributions (or those quantities that are necessary to do Bayesian predictions, e.g., expected
natural parameters and expected sufficient statistics). Furthermore, Park et al. (2017) deals
with only CE family models for obtaining the closed-form MAP estimates of the parame-
ters; while our approach encompasses both CE and non-CE family models. Lastly, Park
et al. (2017) demonstrated their method on small- to medium-sized datasets, which do not
require stochastic learning; while our method takes into account the scenario of stochastic
learning which is essential in the era of big data (Hoffman et al., 2013).
2.5 Variational Bayes
Variational inference is the class of techniques which solve inference problems in probabilis-
tic models using variational methods (Jordan et al., 1999; Wainwright and Jordan, 2008).
The general idea of variational methods is to cast a quantity of interest as an optimisation
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problem. By relaxing the problem in some way, we can replace the original intractable
problem with one that we can solve efficiently.4
The application of variational inference to finding a Bayesian posterior distribution is
called Variational Bayes (VB). Our discussion is focused on the Variational Bayesian EM
(VBEM) algorithm variant. The goal of the algorithm is to compute an approximation q
to the posterior distribution over latent variables and model parameters for models where
exact posterior inference is intractable. This should be contrasted to VEM and EM, which
aim to compute a point estimate of the parameters. VEM and EM can both be understood
as special cases, in which the set of q distributions is constrained such that the approximate
posterior is a Dirac delta function (Beal, 2003). We therefore include them within the
definition of VB. See Blei et al. (2017) for a recent review on variational Bayes, Beal (2003)
for more detailed derivations, and see Appendix D for more information on the relationship
between EM and VBEM.
High-level derivation of VB Consider a generative model that produces a dataset D =
{Dn}Nn=1 consisting of N independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) items (Dn is the nth
input/output pair {xn, yn} for supervised learning, and Dn is the nth vector output yn for
unsupervised learning), generated using a set of latent variables l = {ln}Nn=1. The generative
model provides p(Dn|ln,m), where m are the model parameters. We also consider the prior
distribution over the model parameters p(m) and the prior distribution over the latent
variables p(l).
Variational Bayes recasts the task of approximating the posterior p(l ,m |D) as an op-
timisation problem: making the approximating distribution q(l ,m), which is called the
variational distribution, as similar as possible to the posterior, by minimising some dis-
tance (or divergence) between them. The terminology VB is often assumed to refer to the
standard case, in which the divergence to minimise is the KL-divergence from p(l ,m |D) to
q(l ,m),
DKL(q(l ,m)‖p(l ,m |D)) = Eq
[
log
q(l ,m)
p(l ,m |D)
]
= Eq[log q(l ,m)]− Eq[log p(l ,m |D)]
= Eq[log q(l ,m)]− Eq[log p(l ,m ,D)] + log p(D) . (5)
The arg min of Eq. 5 with respect to q(l ,m) does not depend on the constant log p(D).
Minimising it is therefore equivalent to maximizing
L(q) , Eq[log p(l ,m ,D)]− Eq[log q(l ,m)] = Eq[log p(l ,m ,D)] +H(q) , (6)
where H(q) is the entropy (or differential entropy) of q(l ,m). The entropy of q(l ,m)
rewards simplicity, while Eq[log p(l ,m ,D)], the expected value of the complete data log-
likelihood under the variational distribution, rewards accurately fitting to the data. Since
the KL-divergence is 0 if and only if the two distributions are the same, maximizing L(q) will
4. Note that the “variational” terminology comes from the calculus of variations, which is concerned with
finding optima of functionals. This pertains to probabilistic inference, since distributions are functions,
and we aim to optimise over the space of possible distributions. However, it is typically not necessary
to use the calculus of variations when deriving variational inference algorithms in practice.
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result in q(l ,m) = p(l ,m |D) when the optimisation problem is unconstrained. In practice,
however, we restrict q(l ,m) to a tractable subset of possible distributions. A common choice
for the tractable subset is the set of fully factorized distributions q(l ,m) = q(m)
∏N
n=1 q(ln),
in which case the method is referred to as mean-field variational Bayes.
We can alternatively derive L(q) as a lower bound on the log of the marginal probability
of the data p(D) (the evidence),
log p(D) = log
(∫
dl dm p(l ,m ,D)
)
= log
(∫
dl dm p(l ,m ,D)q(l ,m)
q(l ,m)
)
= log
(
Eq
[p(l ,m ,D)
q(l ,m)
])
≥ Eq
[
log p(l ,m ,D)− log q(l ,m)
]
= L(q) , (7)
where we have made use of Jensen’s inequality. Due to Eq. 7, L(q) is sometimes referred to as
a variational lower bound, and in particular, the Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO), since it is
a lower bound on the log of the model evidence p(D). The VBEM algorithm maximises L(q)
via coordinate ascent over parameters encoding q(l ,m), called the variational parameters.
The E-step optimises the variational parameters pertaining to the latent variables l , and
the M-step optimises the variational parameters pertaining to the model parameters m .
Under certain assumptions, these updates have a certain form, as we will describe below.
These updates are iterated until convergence.
VB for CE models VB simplifies to a two-step procedure when the model falls into the
Conjugate-Exponential (CE) class of models, which satisfy two conditions (Beal, 2003):
(1) The complete-data likelihood is in the exponential family :
p(Dn, ln|m) = g(m)f(Dn, ln) exp(n(m)>s(Dn, ln)), (8)
(2) The prior over m is conjugate to the complete-data likelihood :
p(m |τ,ν) = h(τ,ν)g(m)τ exp(ν>n(m)). (9)
where natural parameters and sufficient statistics of the complete-data likelihood are de-
noted by n(m) and s(Dn, ln), respectively, and g, f, h are some known functions. The
hyperparameters are denoted by τ (a scalar) and ν (a vector).
A large class of models fall in the CE family. Examples include linear dynamical systems
and switching models; Gaussian mixtures; factor analysis and probabilistic PCA; Hidden
Markov Models (HMM) and factorial HMMs; and discrete-variable belief networks. The
models that are widely used but not in the CE family include: Markov Random Fields
(MRFs) and Boltzmann machines; logistic regression; sigmoid belief networks; and Inde-
pendent Component Analysis (ICA). We illustrate how best to bring such models into the
CE family in a later section.
The VB algorithm for a CE family model optimises the lower bound on the model log
marginal likelihood given by Eq. 7 (the ELBO),
L(q(l)q(m)) =
∫
dm dl q(l)q(m) log
p(l ,D,m)
q(l)q(m)
, (10)
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where we assume that the joint approximate posterior distribution over the latent variables
and model parameters q(l ,m) is factorised via the mean-field assumption as
q(l ,m) = q(l)q(m) = q(m)
N∏
n=1
q(ln), (11)
and that each of the variational distributions also has the form of an exponential family
distribution. Computing the derivatives of the variational lower bound in Eq. 10 with
respect to each of these variational distributions and setting them to zero yield the following
two-step procedure.
(1) First, given expected natural parameters n¯, the E-step computes:
q(l) =
N∏
n=1
q(ln) ∝
N∏
n=1
f(Dn, ln) exp(n¯>s(Dn, ln)) =
N∏
n=1
p(ln|Dn, n¯). (12)
Using q(l), it outputs expected sufficient statistics, the expectation of s(Dn, ln)
with probability density q(ln) : s¯(D) = 1N
N∑
n=1
〈s(Dn, ln)〉q(ln).
(2) Second, given expected sufficient statistics s¯(D), the M-step computes:
q(m) = h(τ˜ , ν˜)g(m)τ˜ exp(ν˜>n(m)), where τ˜ = τ +N, ν˜ = ν +N s¯(D). (13)
Using q(m), it outputs expected natural parameters n¯ = 〈n(m)〉q(m).
Stochastic VB for CE models The VB update introduced in Eq. 12 is inefficient
for large data sets because we should optimise the variational posterior over the latent
variables corresponding to each data point before re-estimating the variational posterior
over the parameters. For more efficient learning, we adopt stochastic variational inference,
which uses stochastic optimisation to fit the variational distribution over the parameters.
We repeatedly subsample the data to form noisy estimates of the natural gradient of the
variational lower bound, and we follow these estimates with a decreasing step-size ρt, as
in Hoffman et al. (2013).5 The stochastic variational Bayes algorithm is summarised in
Algorithm 1.
3. Variational Bayes In Private Settings (VIPS) for the CE family
To create an extension of variational Bayes which preserves differential privacy, we need to
inject noise into the algorithm. The design choices for the noise injection procedure must
be carefully made, as they can strongly affect the statistical efficiency of the algorithm, in
terms of its accuracy versus the number of samples in the dataset. We start by introducing
our problem setup.
5. When optimising over a probability distribution, the Euclidean distance between two parameter vectors
is often a poor measure of the dissimilarity of the distributions. The natural gradient of a function
accounts for the information geometry of its parameter space, using a Riemannian metric to adjust the
direction of the traditional gradient, which results in a faster convergence than the traditional gradient
(Hoffman et al., 2013).
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Algorithm 1 (Stochastic) Variational Bayes for CE family distributions
Input: Data D. Define ρt = (τ0 + t)−κ and mini-batch size S.
Output: Expected natural parameters n¯ and expected sufficient statistics s¯.
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given the expected natural parameters n¯, compute q(ln) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Output the expected sufficient statistics s¯ = 1S
∑S
n=1〈s(Dn, ln)〉q(ln).
(2) M-step: Given s¯, compute q(m) by ν˜(t) = ν+N s¯. Set ν˜(t) ←[ (1−ρt)ν˜(t−1)+ρtν˜(t).
Output the expected natural parameters n¯ = 〈m〉q(m).
end for
3.1 Problem setup
A naive way to privatise the VB algorithm is by perturbing both q(l) and q(m). Unfortu-
nately, this is impractical, due to the excessive amounts of additive noise (recall: we have
as many latent variables as the number of datapoints). We propose to perturb the expected
sufficient statistics only. What follows next explains why this makes sense.
While the VB algorithm is being run, the places where the algorithm needs to look at
the data are (1) when computing the variational posterior over the latent variables q(l);
and (2) when computing the expected sufficient statistics s¯(D) given q(l) in the E-step. In
our proposed approach, we compute q(l) behind the privacy wall (see below), and compute
the expected sufficient statistics using q(l), as shown in Fig. 1. Before outputting the
expected sufficient statistics, we perturb each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics
to compensate the maximum difference in 〈sl(Dj , l j)〉q(lj) caused by both Dj and q(l j). The
perturbed expected sufficient statistics then dictate the expected natural parameters in the
M-step. Hence we do not need an additional step to add noise to q(m).
The reason we neither perturb nor output q(l) for training data is that we do not need
q(l) itself most of the time. For instance, when computing the predictive probability for test
datapoints Dtst, we need to perform the E-step to obtain the variational posterior for the
test data q(l tst), which is a function of the test data and the expected natural parameters
n¯, given as
p(Dtst|D) =
∫
dmdl tst p(Dtst|l tst,m) q(l tst;Dtst, n¯) q(m ; ν˜), (14)
where the dependence on the training data D is implicit in the approximate posteriors
q(m) through ν˜; and the expected natural parameters n¯. Hence, outputting the perturbed
sufficient statistics and the expected natural parameters suffice for protecting the privacy
of individuals in the training data. Furthermore, the M-step can be performed based on the
(privatised) output of the E-step, without querying the data again, so we do not need to add
any further noise to the M-step to ensure privacy, due to the fact that differential privacy
is immune to data-independent post-processing. To sum up, we provide our problem setup
as below.
1. Privacy wall: We assume that the sensitive training dataset is only accessible through
a sanitising interface which we call a privacy wall. The training data stay behind the
privacy wall, and adversaries have access to the outputs of our algorithm only, i.e., no
12
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Figure 1: Schematic of VIPS. Given the initial expected natural parameters n¯(0), we com-
pute the variational posterior over the latent variables q(l). Since q(l) is a function of not
only the expected natural parameters but also the data D, we compute q(l) behind the
privacy wall. Using q(l), we then compute the expected sufficient statistics. Note that
we neither perturb nor output q(l) itself. Instead, when we noise up the expected suffi-
cient statistics before outputting, we add noise to each coordinate of the expected sufficient
statistics in order to compensate the maximum difference in 〈sl(Dj , l j)〉q(lj) caused by both
Dj and q(l j). In the M-step, we compute the variational posterior over the parameters
q(m) using the perturbed expected sufficient statistics ˜¯s(1). Using q(m), we compute the
expected natural parameters ˜¯n(1), which is already perturbed since it is a function of ˜¯s(1).
We continue performing these two steps until convergence.
direct access to the training data, although they may have further prior knowledge on
some of the individuals that are included in the training data.
2. Training phase: Our differentially private VB algorithm releases the perturbed ex-
pected natural parameters and perturbed expected sufficient statistics in every itera-
tion. Every release of a perturbed parameter based on the training data triggers an
update in the log moment functions (see Sec 3.2 on how these are updated). At the
end of the training phase, the final privacy parameters are calculated based on (4).
3. Test phase: Test data are public (or belong to users), i.e., outside the privacy wall.
Bayesian prediction on the test data is possible using the released expected natural
parameters and expected sufficient statistics (given as Eq. 14). Note that we do not
consider protecting the privacy of the individuals in the test data.
3.2 How to compute the log moment functions?
Recall that to use the moments accountant method, we need to compute the log moment
functions αMt for each individual iteration t. An iteration t of VIPS randomly subsamples
a ν fraction of the dataset and uses it to compute the sufficient statistics which is then
perturbed via the Gaussian mechanism with variance σ2I. How the log moment function
is computed depends on the sensitivity of the sufficient statistics as well as the underlying
mechanism; we next discuss how each of these aspects.
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Sensitivity analysis Suppose there are two neighbouring datasets D and D′, where D′
has one entry difference compared to D (i.e., by removing one entry from D).
We denote the vector of expected sufficient statistics by s¯(D) = 1N
∑N
n=1 s¯(Dn) =
[M1, · · · ,ML], where each expected sufficient statistic Ml is given by
Ml =
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈sl(Di, l i)〉q(l i) . (15)
When computing the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics, we assume, without
loss of generality, the last entry removed from D maximises the difference in the expected
sufficient statistics run on the two datasets D and D′. Under this assumption and the i.i.d.
assumption on the likelihood, given the current expected natural parameters n¯, all q(l i)
and sl(Di, l i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} evaluated on the dataset D are the same as q(l ′i) and
sl(D′i, l ′i) evaluated on the dataset D′. Hence, the sensitivity is given by
∆Ml = max|D\D′|1=1
|Ml(D)−Ml(D′)|,
= max
|D\D′|1=1
| 1N
N∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)− 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l ′i)sl(D′i, l ′i)|,
= max
|D\D′|1=1
| 1N
N∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)− 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)|,
since Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i) = Eq(l ′i)sl(D′i, l ′i) for i = {1, . . . , N − 1},
≤ max
|D\D′|1=1
|N−1N 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i) + 1NEq(lN )sl(DN , lN )− NN 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)|
≤ max
|D\D′|1=1
| − 1N 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i) + 1NEq(lN )sl(DN , lN )|,
≤ max
DN ,q(lN )
2
N |Eq(lN )sl(DN , lN )|, (16)
where the last line is because the average (over the N−1 terms) expected sufficient statistics
is less than equal to the maximum expected sufficient statistics (recall: we assumed that
the last entry maximises the difference in the expected sufficient statistics), i.e.,
| 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)| ≤ 1N−1
N−1∑
i=1
|Eq(l i)sl(Di, l i)| ≤ |Eq(lN )sl(DN , lN )|, (17)
and due to the triangle inequality.
As in many existing works (e.g., (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012), among many
others), we also assume that the dataset is pre-processed such that the L2 norm of any Di
is less than 1. Furthermore, we choose q(l i) such that its support is bounded. Under these
conditions, each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics 〈sl(Di, l i)〉q(l i) has limited
sensitivity. We will add noise to each coordinate of the expected sufficient statistics to
compensate this bounded maximum change in the E-step.
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Log Moment Function of the Gaussian Mechanism with Subsampled data Ob-
serve that iteration t of our algorithm subsamples a ν fraction of the dataset, computes the
sufficient statistics based on this subsample, and perturbs it using the Gaussian mechanism
with variance σ2Id. To simplify the privacy calculations, we assume that each example in
the dataset is included in a minibatch according to an independent coin flip with probabil-
ity ν. This differs slightly from the standard assumption for stochastic learning algorithms
(e.g., stochastic gradient descent), in which a fixed minibatch size S is typically used in
each iteration. However, following Abadi et al. (2016), for simplicity of analysis, we will
also assume that the instances are included independently with probability ν = SN ; and for
ease of implementation, we will use minibatches with fixed size S in our experiments.
From Proposition 1.6 in Bun and Steinke (2016) along with simple algebra, the log
moment function of the Gaussian Mechanism M applied to a query with L2-sensitivity ∆
is αM(λ) =
λ(λ+1)∆2
2σ2
. To compute the log moment function for the subsampled Gaussian
Mechanism, we follow Abadi et al. (2016). Let β0 and β1 be the densities N (0, (σ/∆)2)
and N (1, (σ/∆)2), and let β = (1 − ν)β0 + νβ1 be the mixture density; then, the log
moment function at λ is max log(E1, E2) where E1 = Ez∼β0 [(β0(z)/β(z))λ] and E2 =
Ez∼β[(β(z)/β0(z))λ]. E1 and E2 can be numerically calculated for any λ, and we main-
tain the log moments over a grid of λ values.
Note that our algorithms are run for a prespecified number of iterations, and with a
prespecified σ; this ensures that the moments accountant analysis is correct, and we do not
need an a data-dependent adaptive analysis such as in Rogers et al. (2016).
Also, note that when using the subsampled data per iteration, the sensitivity analysis
has to be modified as now the query is evaluated on a smaller dataset. Hence, the 1/N
factor has to be changed to 1/S in Eq. 16:
∆Ml ≤ maxDS ,q(lS)
2
S |Eq(lS)sl(DS , lS)| . (18)
Algorithm 2 summarizes our VIPS algorithm that performs differentially private stochas-
tic variational Bayes for CE family models.
Algorithm 2 Private VIPS for CE family distributions
Input: Data D. Define ρt = (τ0 +t)−κ, noise variance σ2, mini-batch size S, and maximum
iterations J .
Output: Perturb expected natural parameters ˜¯n and expected sufficient statistics ˜¯s.
Compute the L2-sensitivity ∆ of the expected sufficient statistics.
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given the expected natural parameters n¯, compute q(ln) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Perturb each coordinate of s¯ = 1S
∑S
n=1〈s(Dn, ln)〉q(ln) by adding N (0, σ2∆2I) noise,
and output ˜¯s. Update the log moment functions.
(2) M-step: Given ˜¯s, compute q(m) by ν˜(t) = ν+N ˜¯s. Set ν˜(t) ←[ (1−ρt)ν˜(t−1)+ρtν˜(t).
Output the expected natural parameters ˜¯n = 〈m〉q(m).
end for
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4. VIPS for latent Dirichlet allocation
Here, we illustrate how to use the general framework of VIPS for CE family in the example
of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA).
4.1 Model specifics in LDA
The most widely used topic model is Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) (Blei et al., 2003).
Its generative process is given by
• Draw topics βk ∼ Dirichlet (η1V ), for k = {1, . . . ,K}, where η is a scalar hyperaram-
eter.
• For each document d ∈ {1, . . . , D}
– Draw topic proportions θd ∼ Dirichlet (α1K), where α is a scalar hyperarameter.
– For each word n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
∗ Draw topic assignments zdn ∼ Discrete(θd)
∗ Draw word wdn ∼ Discrete(βzdn)
where each observed word is represented by an indicator vector wdn (nth word in the dth
document) of length V , and where V is the number of terms in a fixed vocabulary set. The
topic assignment latent variable zdn is also an indicator vector of length K, where K is the
number of topics.
The LDA model falls in the CE family, viewing zd,1:N and θd as two types of latent
variables: ld = {zd,1:N ,θd}, and β as model parameters m = β. The conditions for CE are
satisfied: (1) the complete-data likelihood per document is in exponential family:
p(wd,1:N , zd,1:N ,θd|β) ∝ f(Dd, zd,1:N ,θd) exp(
∑
n
∑
k
[logβk]
>[zkdnwdn]), (19)
where f(Dd, zd,1:N ,θd) ∝ exp([α1K ]>[log θd] +
∑
n
∑
k z
k
dn log θ
k
d); and (2) we have a conju-
gate prior over βk:
p(βk|η1V ) ∝ exp([η1V ]>[logβk]), (20)
for k = {1, . . . ,K}. For simplicity, we assume hyperparameters α and η are set manually.
Under the LDA model, we assume the variational posteriors are given by
• Discrete : q(zkdn|φkdn) ∝ exp(zkdn logφkdn), with variational parameters for capturing
the posterior topic assignment,
φkdn ∝ exp(〈logβk〉q(βk)>wdn + 〈log θkd〉q(θd)). (21)
• Dirichlet : q(θd|γd) ∝ exp(γd> log θd),where γd = α1K +
∑N
n=1〈zdn〉q(zdn),
where these two distributions are computed iteratively in the E-step behind the privacy wall.
The expected sufficient statistics are s¯k =
1
D
∑
d
∑
n〈zkdn〉q(zdn)wdn = 1D
∑
d
∑
nφ
k
dnwdn due
to Eq. 21. Then, in the M-step, we compute the posterior
• Dirichlet : q(βk|λk) ∝ exp(λk> logβk), where λk = η1V +
∑
d
∑
n〈zkdn〉q(zdn)wdn.
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4.2 VIPS for LDA
We follow the general framework of VIPS for differentially private LDA, with the addition of
several LDA-specific heuristics which are important for good performance, described below.
First, while each document originally has a different document length Nd, in order to bound
the sensitivity, and to ensure that the signal-to-noise ratio remains reasonable for very short
documents, we preprocess all documents to have the same fixed length N . We accomplish
this by sampling N words with replacement from each document’s bag of words. In our
experiments, we use N = 500.
To perturb the expected sufficient statistics, which is a matrix of size K × V , we add
Gaussian noise to each component of this matrix:
˜¯svk = s¯
v
k + Y
v
k , where Y
v
k ∼ N (0, σ2(∆s¯)2), (22)
where s¯vk =
1
S
∑
d
∑
nφ
k
dnw
v
dn, and ∆s¯ is the sensitivity. We then map the perturbed
components to 0 if they become negative. For LDA, the worst-case sensitivity is given by
∆s¯ = max
|D\D′|=1
√∑
k
∑
v
(s¯vk(D)− s¯vk(D′))2,
= max
|D\D′|=1
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
(
1
S
∑
n
S∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn −
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
)2
,
= max
|D\D′|=1
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣S − 1S 1S − 1 ∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn +
1
S
∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn −
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
= max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣ 1S∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn −
1
S
(
1
S − 1
∑
n
S−1∑
d=1
φkdnw
v
dn
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
= max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
√√√√∑
k
∑
v
∣∣∣∣∣ 1S∑
n
φkSnw
v
Sn
∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
since 0 ≤ φkdn ≤ 1, wvdn ∈ {0, 1}, and we assume 0 ≤ 1S−1
∑
n
∑S−1
d=1 φ
k
dnw
v
dn ≤
∑
nφ
k
Snw
v
Sn,
≤ max
φkSn,w
v
Sn
1
S
∑
n
(
∑
k
φkSn)(
∑
v
wvSn) ≤
N
S
, (23)
since
∑
k φ
k
Sn = 1, and
∑
v w
v
Sn = 1. This sensitivity accounts for the worst case in
which all N words in wS are assigned to the same entry of s¯, i.e. they all have the same
word type v, and are hard-assigned to the same topic k in the variational distribution. In
our practical implementation, we improve the sensitivity by exploiting the fact that most
typical documents’ normalized expected sufficient statistic matrices s¯dvk =
1
S
∑
nφ
k
dnw
v
dn (a
K×V matrix for document d) have a much smaller norm than this worst case. Specifically,
inspired by Abadi et al. (2016), we apply a norm clipping strategy, in which the contribution
s¯d of each document to the sufficient statistics matrix s¯ =
∑
d s¯
d is clipped (or projected)
such that the Frobenious norm of the matrix is bounded by |s¯d| ≤ aNS , for a user-specified
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Algorithm 3 VIPS for LDA
Input: Data D. Define D (documents), V (vocabulary), K (number of topics).
Define ρt = (τ0 + t)
−κ, mini-batch size S, hyperparameters α, η, σ2, and a
Output: Privatised expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk) and sufficient statistics ˜¯s.
Compute the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics given in Eq. 23.
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk)
s¯ := 0
for d = 1, . . . , S do
for r = 1, . . . , R do
Compute q(zkdn) parameterised by φ
k
dn ∝ exp(〈logβk〉q(βk)>wdn + 〈log θkd〉q(θd)).
Compute q(θd) parameterised by γd = α1K +
∑N
n=1〈zdn〉q(zdn).
end for
s¯dvk :=
1
S
∑
nφ
k
dnw
v
dn
if |s¯d| > aN/S then
s¯d := aNS
s¯d
|s¯d|
end if
s¯ := s¯ + s¯d
end for
Output the perturbed expected sufficient statistics ˜¯svk = s¯ + Y
v
k , where Y
v
k is Gaussian
noise given in Eq. 22, but using sensitivity aN/S.
Clip negative entries of ˜¯s to 0.
Update the log-moment functions.
(2) M-step: Given perturbed expected sufficient statistics ˜¯sk,
Compute q(βk) parameterised by λ
(t)
k = η1V +D˜¯sk.
Set λ(t) ←[ (1− ρt)λ(t−1) + ρtλ(t).
Output expected natural parameters 〈logβk〉q(βk).
end for
a ∈ (0, 1]. For each document, if this criterion is not satisfied, we project the expected
sufficient statistics down to the required norm via
s¯d := a
N
S
s¯d
|s¯d| . (24)
After this the procedure, the sensitivity of the entire matrix becomes a∆s¯ (i.e., aN/S), and
we add noise on this scale to the clipped expected sufficient statistics. We set a = 0.1 in
our experiments, which empirically resulted in clipping being applied to around 12 to
3
4 of
the documents. The resulting algorithm is summarised in Algorithm 3.
4.3 Experiments using Wikipedia data
We downloaded a random D = 400, 000 documents from Wikipedia to test our VIPS algo-
rithm. We used 50 topics and a vocabulary set of approximately 8000 terms. The algorithm
was run for one epoch in each experiment.
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Figure 2: Epsilon versus perplexity, varying σ and S, Wikipedia data, one epoch. The
parameters for the two data points indicated by the pink circles do not satisfy the conditions
of the moments accountant composition theorem, so those  values are not formally proved.
We compared our moments accountant approach with a baseline method using the strong
composition (Theorem 3.20 of Dwork and Roth (2014)), resulting from the max divergence
of the privacy loss random variable being bounded by a total budget including a slack
variable δ, which yields (J′(e′ − 1) +√2J log(1/δ′′)′, δ′′ + Jδ′)-DP.
As our evaluation metric, we compute an upper bound on the perplexity on held-out
documents. Perplexity is an information-theoretic measure of the predictive performance of
probabilistic models which is commonly used in the context of language modeling (Jelinek
et al., 1977). The perplexity of a probabilistic model pmodel(x) on a test set of N data
points xi (e.g. words in a corpus) is defined as
b−
1
N
∑N
i=1 logb pmodel(xi) , (25)
where b is generally either 2 or e, corresponding to a measurement based on either bits or
nats, respectively. We can interpret − 1N
∑N
i=1 logb pmodel(xi) as the cross-entropy between
the model and the empirical distribution. This is the expected number of bits (nats) needed
to encode a data point from the empirical data distribution (i.e. a word in our case), under
an optimal code based on the model. Perplexity is b to the power of the cross entropy, which
19
Park Foulds Chaudhuri and Welling
104 105
Documents processed
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Pe
rp
le
xi
ty
Strong composition
Moments accountant
Non-private
Figure 3: Perplexity per iteration. Wikipedia data, S = 20, 000,  = 2.44, one epoch.
converts the number of bits (nats) in the encoding to the number of possible values in an
encoding of that length (supposing the cross entropy were integer valued). Thus, perplexity
measures the effective vocabulary size when using the model to encode the data, which is
understood as a reflection of how confused (i.e. “perplexed”) the model is. In our case,
pmodel is the posterior predictive distribution under our variational approximation to the
posterior, which is intractable to compute. Following Hoffman et al. (2010), we approximate
perplexity based on the learned variational distribution, measured in nats, by plugging the
ELBO into Equation 25, which results in an upper bound:
perplexity(Dtest,λ) ≤ exp
−(∑
i
〈log p(ntest,θi, zi|λ)〉q(θi,zi) − 〈log q(θ, z)〉q(θ,z)
)
/
∑
i,n
ntesti,n
 ,
where ntesti is a vector of word counts for the ith document, n
test = {ntesti }Ii=1. In the
above, we use the λ that was calculated during training. We compute the posteriors over z
and θ by performing the first step in our algorithm using the test data and the perturbed
sufficient statistics we obtain during training. We adapted the python implementation by
the authors of (Hoffman et al., 2010) for our experiments.
Figure 2 shows the trade-off between  and per-word perplexity on the Wikipedia dataset
for the different methods under a variety of conditions, in which we varied the value of
σ ∈ {1.0, 1.1, 1.24, 1.5, 2} and the minibatch size S ∈ {5, 000, 10, 000, 20, 000}. We found
that the moments accountant composition substantially outperformed strong composition
in each of these settings. Here, we used relatively large minibatches, which were necessary to
control the signal-to-noise ratio in order to obtain reasonable results for private LDA. Larger
minibatches thus had lower perplexity. However, due to its impact on the subsampling rate,
increasing S comes at the cost of a higher  for a fixed number of documents processed (in
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our case, one epoch). The minibatch size S is limited by the conditions of the moments
accountant composition theorem shown by Abadi et al. (2016), with the largest valid value
being obtained at around S ≈ 20, 000 for the small noise regime where σ ≈ 1. To show
the convergence behavior of the algorithms, we also report the perplexity per iteration in
Figure 3. We found that the gaps between methods remain relatively constant at each stage
of the learning process. Similar results were observed for other values of σ and S.
In Table 1, for each method, we show the top 10 words in terms of assigned probabilities
for 3 example topics. Non-private LDA results in the most coherent words among all
the methods. For the private LDA models with a total privacy budget  = 2.44 (S =
20, 000, σ = 1.24), as we move from moments accountant to strong composition, the amount
of noise added gets larger, and the topics become less coherent. We also observe that the
probability mass assigned to the most probable words decreases with the noise, and thus
strong composition gave less probability to the top words compared to the other methods.
5. VIPS for non-CE family
Under non-CE family models, the complete-data likelihood typically has the following form:
p(Dn, ln|m) ∝ exp(−h(m , s(Dn, ln))) , (26)
which includes some function h(m , s(Dn, ln)) that cannot be split into two functions, where
one is a function of only m and the other is a function of only s(Dn, ln). Hence, we cannot
apply the general VIPS framework we described in the previous section to this case.
However, when the models we consider have binomial likelihoods, for instance, under
negative binomial regression, nonlinear mixed-effects models, spatial models for count data,
and logistic regression, we can bring the non-CE models to the CE family by adopting the
Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation strategy introduced by Polson et al. (2013).
Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation introduces an
auxiliary variable that is Po´lya-Gamma distributed per datapoint, such that the log-odds
can be written as mixtures of Gaussians with respect to a Po´lya-Gamma distribution, as
stated in Theorem 1 in (Polson et al., 2013):
exp(ψn)
yn
(1 + exp(ψn))b
= 2−b exp((yn − b2)ψn)
∫ ∞
0
exp(− ξnψ2n2 ) p(ξn) dξn (27)
where ψn is a linear function in model parameters m , yn is the nth observation, and ξn is a
Po´lya-Gamma random variable, ξn ∼ PG(b, 0) where b > 0. For example, ψn = m>xn for
models without latent variables and xn is the nth input vector, or ψn = m
>ln for models
with latent variables in unsupervised learning. Note that b is set depending on which
binomial model one uses. For example, b = 1 in logistic regression. When ψn = ln
>m and
b = 1, we express the likelihood as:
p(Dn|ln,m) = 2−1 exp((yn − 12)ln>m)
∫ ∞
0
exp(−12ξnln>mm>ln)p(ξn)dξn. (28)
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Table 1: Posterior topics from private ( = 2.44) and non-private LDA
Non-private Moments Acc. Strong Comp.
topic 33: topic 33: topic 33:
german 0.0244 function 0.0019 resolution 0.0003
system 0.0160 domain 0.0017 northward 0.0003
group 0.0109 german 0.0011 deeply 0.0003
based 0.0089 windows 0.0011 messages 0.0003
science 0.0077 software 0.0010 research 0.0003
systems 0.0076 band 0.0007 dark 0.0003
computer 0.0072 mir 0.0006 river 0.0003
software 0.0071 product 0.0006 superstition 0.0003
space 0.0061 resolution 0.0006 don 0.0003
power 0.0060 identity 0.0005 found 0.0003
topic 35: topic 35: topic 35:
station 0.0846 station 0.0318 station 0.0118
line 0.0508 line 0.0195 line 0.0063
railway 0.0393 railway 0.0149 railway 0.0055
opened 0.0230 opened 0.0074 opened 0.0022
services 0.0187 services 0.0064 services 0.0015
located 0.0163 closed 0.0056 stations 0.0015
closed 0.0159 code 0.0054 closed 0.0014
owned 0.0158 country 0.0052 section 0.0013
stations 0.0122 located 0.0051 platform 0.0012
platform 0.0109 stations 0.0051 company 0.0010
topic 37: topic 37: topic 37:
born 0.1976 born 0.0139 born 0.0007
american 0.0650 people 0.0096 american 0.0006
people 0.0572 notable 0.0092 street 0.0006
summer 0.0484 american 0.0075 charles 0.0004
notable 0.0447 name 0.0031 said 0.0004
canadian 0.0200 mountain 0.0026 events 0.0004
event 0.0170 japanese 0.0025 people 0.0003
writer 0.0141 fort 0.0025 station 0.0003
dutch 0.0131 character 0.0019 written 0.0003
actor 0.0121 actor 0.0014 point 0.0003
By introducing a variational posterior over the auxiliary variables, we introduce a new
objective function (See Appendix A for derivation)
Ln(q(m), q(ln), q(ξn))
=
∫
q(m)q(ln)q(ξn) log
p(Dn|ln, ξn,m)p(ln)p(ξn)p(m)
q(m)q(ln)q(ξn)
, (29)
= − log 2 + (yn − 12)〈ln〉q(ln)>〈m〉q(m) − 12〈ξn〉q(ξn)〈ln>mm>ln〉q(ln)q(m),
−DKL(q(ξn)||p(ξn))−DKL(q(m)||p(m))−DKL(q(ln)||p(ln)).22
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The first derivative of the lower lower bound with respect to q(ξn) gives us a closed form
update rule
∂
∂q(ξn)
Ln(q(m), q(ln), q(ξn)) = 0, 7→ q(ξn) ∝ PG(1,
√
〈ln>mm>ln〉q(ln)q(m)). (30)
The rest updates for q(ln)q(m) follow the standard updates under the conjugate exponential
family distributions, since the lower bound to the conditional likelihood term includes only
linear and quadratic terms both in ln and m . By introducing the auxiliary variables, the
complete-data likelihood conditioned on ξn (with some prior on ln) now has the form of
p(Dn, ln|m , ξn) ∝ p(Dn|ln,m , ξn) p(ln),
∝ exp(n(m)>s(Dn, ln, ξn)) p(ln), (31)
which consists of natural parameters and sufficient statistics given by
n(m) =
[
m
vec(−12mm>)
]
, s(Dn, ln, ξn) =
[
(yn − 12)ln
vec(ξnlnln
>)
]
. (32)
Note that now not only the latent and observed variables but also the new variables ξi form
the complete-data sufficient statistics. The resulting variational Bayes algorithm for models
with binomial likelihoods is given by
(a) Given the expected natural parameters n¯, the E-step yields:
q(l , ξ) =
N∏
n=1
q(ln)q(ξn) ∝ p(ξ) exp
[∫
dm q(m) log p(D, l |m , ξ)
]
,
∝ p(ξ)p(l)
N∏
n=1
exp(n¯>s(Dn, ln, ξn)),
where q(ξn) = PG(1,
√
〈l i>mm>ln〉q(ln,m)), and p(ξn) = PG(1, 0) (33)
q(ln) ∝ p(ln) exp(n¯>〈s(Dn, ln, ξn)〉q(ξn)). (34)
Using q(l)q(ξ), it outputs s¯(D) = 1N
∑N
n=1〈s(Dn, ln, ξn)〉q(ln)q(ξn).
(b) Given the expected sufficient statistics s¯, the M-step yields:
q(m) ∝ p(m) exp
[∫
dl dξ q(l)q(ξ) log p(D, l |m , ξ)
]
,
∝ exp(n(m)>ν˜), where ν˜ = ν +N s¯(D). (35)
Using q(m), it outputs the expected natural parameters n¯ := 〈n(m)〉q(m).
Similar to the VIPS algorithm for the CE family, perturbing the expected sufficient statistics
s¯(D) in the E-step suffices for privatising all the outputs of the algorithm. Algorithm 4
summarizes private stochastic variational Bayes algorithm for non-CE family with binomial
likelihoods.
As a side note, in order to use the variational lower bound as a stopping criterion,
one needs to draw samples from the Po´lya-Gamma posterior to numerically calculate the
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Algorithm 4 (tot, δtot)-DP VIPS for non-CE family with binomial likelihoods
Input: Data D. Define ρt = (τ0 + t)−κ, mini-batch size S, maximum iterations J , and σ.
Output: Perturb expected natural parameters ˜¯n and expected sufficient stats ˜¯s.
Compute the L2-sensitivity ∆ of the expected sufficient statistics.
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters n¯, compute q(ln)q(ξn) for
n = 1, . . . , S. Perturb each coordinate of s¯ = 1S
∑S
n=1〈s(Dn, ln)〉q(ln)q(ξn) by adding
noise drawn from N (0, σ2∆2). Output ˜¯s.
Update the moments function.
(2) M-step: Given ˜¯s, compute q(m) by ν˜(t) = ν+N ˜¯s. Set ν˜(t) ←[ (1−ρt)ν˜(t−1)+ρtν˜(t).
Output the expected natural parameters ˜¯n = 〈m〉q(m).
end for
lower bound given in Eq. 29. This might be a problem if one does not have access to the
Po´lya-Gamma posterior, since our algorithm only outputs the perturbed expected sufficient
statistics in the E-step (not the Po´lya-Gamma posterior itself). However, one could use
other stopping criteria, which do not require sampling from the Po´lya-Gamma posterior,
e.g., calculating the prediction accuracy in the classification case.
6. VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
We present an example of non-CE family, Bayesian logistic regression, and illustrate how
to employ the VIPS framework given in Algorithm 4 in such a case.
6.1 Model specifics
Under the logistic regression model with the Gaussian prior on the weights m ∈ Rd,
p(yn = 1|xn,m) = σ(m>xn), p(m |α) = N (m |0, α−1I), p(α) = Gam(a0, b0), (36)
where σ(m>xn) = 1/(1 + exp(−m>xn)), the nth input is xn ∈ Rd, and the nth output is
yn ∈ {0, 1}. In logistic regression, there are no latent variables. Hence, the complete-data
likelihood coincides the data likelihood,
p(yn|xn,m) = exp(ψn)
yn
1 + exp(ψn)
, (37)
where ψn = xn
>m . Since the likelihood is not in the CE family. We use the Po´lya-Gamma
data augmentation trick to re-write it as
p(yn|xn, ξn,m) ∝ exp((yn − 12)xn>m) exp(−12ξnxn>mm>xn), (38)
and the data likelihood conditioned on ξn is
p(yn|xn,m , ξn) ∝ exp(n(m)>s(Dn, ξn)), (39)
where the natural parameters and sufficient statistics are given by
n(m) =
[
m
vec(−12mm>)
]
, s(Dn, ξn) =
[
(yn − 12)xn
vec(ξnxnxn
>)
]
. (40)
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Algorithm 5 VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
Input: Data D. Define ρt = (τ0 + t)−κ, mini-batch size S, and maximum iterations J
Output: Privatised expected natural parameters ˜¯n and expected sufficient statistics ˜¯s
Using the sensitivity of the expected sufficient statistics given in Eq. 50 and Eq. 52,
for t = 1, . . . , J do
(1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters n¯, compute q(ξn) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Perturb s¯ = 1S
∑S
n=1〈s(Dn, ξn)〉q(ξn) by Eq. 49 and Eq. 51, and output ˜¯s.
Update the moments function.
(2) M-step: Given ˜¯s, compute q(m) by ν˜(t) = ν+N ˜¯s. Set ν˜(t) ←[ (1−ρt)ν˜(t−1)+ρtν˜(t).
Using ν˜(t), update q(α) by Eq. 46, and output ˜¯n = 〈m〉q(m).
end for
Variational Bayes in Bayesian logistic regression Using the likelihood given in
Eq. 31, we compute the posterior distribution over m , α, ξ by maximising the following
variational lower bound due to Eq. 29
L(q(m), q(ξ), q(α)) =
N∑
n=1
[
− log 2 + (yn − 12)xn>〈m〉q(m) − 12〈ξn〉q(ξn)xn>〈mm>〉q(m)xn
]
,
−
N∑
n=1
DKL(q(ξn)||p(ξn))−DKL(q(m)||p(m))−DKL(q(α)||p(α)).
In the E-step, we update
q(ξ) ∝ p(ξ)
N∏
n=1
exp(n¯(m)>s(Dn, ξn)), (41)
=
N∏
n=1
q(ξn), where q(ξn) = PG(1,
√
xn>〈mm>〉q(m)xn). (42)
Using q(ξ), we compute the expected sufficient statistics
s¯ = 1N
N∑
n=1
s¯(Dn), where s¯(Dn) =
[
s¯1(Dn)
s¯2(Dn)
]
=
[
1
N (yn − 12)xn
1
N vec(〈ξn〉q(ξn)xnxn>)
]
. (43)
In the M-step, we compute q(m) and q(α) by
q(m) ∝ p(D|m , 〈ξ〉) p(m |〈α〉) ∝ exp(n(m)>ν˜) = N (m |µm ,Σm), (44)
q(α) ∝ p(m |α)p(α|a0, b0) = Gamma(aN , bN ), (45)
where ν˜ = ν +N s¯, ν = [0d, 〈α〉q(α)Id], and
aN = a0 +
d
2 , bN = b0 +
1
2(µm
>µm + tr(Σm)). (46)
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Figure 4: Posterior mean of each PG variable 〈ξi〉 as a function of
√
xi>〈mm>〉xi. The
maximum value of 〈ξi〉 is 0.25 when
√
xn>〈mm>〉xn = 0,
Mapping from ν˜ to (µm ,Σm) is deterministic, as below, where s¯1 =
∑N
n=1 s¯1(Dn) and
s¯2 =
∑N
n=1 s¯2(Dn),
ν˜ =
[
N s¯1 + 0d
N s¯2 + 〈α〉q(α)Id
]
=
[
Σ−1m µm
Σ−1m
]
. (47)
Using q(m), we compute expected natural parameters
〈n(m)〉q(m) =
[ 〈m〉q(m)
vec(−12〈mm>〉q(m))
]
=
[
µm
vec(−12(Σm + µmµm>))
]
. (48)
6.2 VIPS for Bayesian logistic regression
Following the general framework of VIPS, we perturb the expected sufficient statistics. For
perturbing s¯1, we add Gaussian noise to each coordinate,
˜¯s1 = s¯1 + Y1,...,d, where Yi ∼i.i.d. N
(
0, σ2∆s¯21
)
(49)
where the sensitivity ∆s¯1 is given by
∆s¯1 = max|D\D′|=1
|s¯1(D)− s¯1(D′)|2 ≤ max
xn,yn
2
N |(yn − 12)| |xn|2 ≤ 2N , (50)
due to Eq. 16 and the assumption that the dataset is preprocessed such that any input has
a maximum L2-norm of 1.
For perturbing s¯2, we follow the Analyze Gauss (AG) algorithm (Dwork et al.). We
first draw Gaussian random variables z ∼ N (0, σ2(∆s¯2)2I) . Using z, we construct a upper
triangular matrix (including diagonal), then copy the upper part to the lower part so that
the resulting matrix Z becomes symmetric. Then, we add this noisy matrix to the covariance
matrix
˜¯s2 = s¯2 + Z. (51)
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The perturbed covariance might not be positive definite. In such case, we project the nega-
tive eigenvalues to some value near zero to maintain positive definiteness of the covariance
matrix. The sensitivity of s¯2 in Frobenius norm is given by
∆s¯2 = max
xn,q(ξn)
2
N |〈ξn〉q(ξn)vec(xnxn>)|2 ≤ 12N , (52)
due to Eq. 16 and the fact that the mean of a PG variable 〈ξn〉 is given by∫ ∞
0
ξn PG(ξn| 1,
√
xn>〈mm>〉xn)dξn = 1
2
√
xn>〈mm>〉xn
tanh
(√
xn>〈mm>〉xn
2
)
.
As shown in Fig. 4, the maximum value is 0.25.
Since there are two perturbations (one for s¯1 and the other for s¯2) in each iteration, we
plug in 2J instead of the maximum iteration number J , when calculating the total privacy
loss using the moments accountant. Our VIPS algorithm for Bayesian logistic regression is
given in Algorithm 5.
6.3 Experiments with Stroke data
We used the stroke dataset, which was first introduced by Letham et al. (2014) for predicting
the occurrence of a stroke within a year after an atrial fibrillation diagnosis.6 There are
N = 12, 586 patients in this dataset, and among these patients, 1,786 (14%) had a stroke
within a year of the atrial fibrillation diagnosis.
Following Letham et al. (2014), we also considered all drugs and all medical conditions
of these patients as candidate predictors. A binary predictor variable is used for indicating
the presence or absence of each drug or condition in the longitudinal record prior to the
atrial fibrillation diagnosis. In addition, a pair of binary variables is used for indicating age
and gender. These totalled d = 4, 146 unique features for medications and conditions. We
randomly shuffled the data to make 5 pairs of training and test sets. For each set, we used
10, 069 patients’ records as training data and the rest as test data.
Using this dataset, we ran our VIPS algorithm in batch mode, i.e., using the entire
training data in each iteration, as opposed to using a small subset of data. We also ran the
private and non-private Empirical Risk Minimisation (ERM) algorithms (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011), in which we performed 5-fold cross-validation to set the regularisation constant given
each training/test pair. As a performance measure, we calculated the Area Under the Curve
(AUC) on each test data, given the posteriors over the latent and parameters in case of BLR
and the parameter estimate in case of ERM. In Fig. 5, we show the mean and 1-standard
deviation of the AUCs obtained by each method.
7. VIPS for sigmoid belief networks
As a last example model, we consider the Sigmoid Belief Network (SBN) model, which
as first introduced in Neal (1992), for modeling N binary observations in terms of binary
hidden variables and some parameters shown as Fig. 6. The complete-data likelihood for
6. The authors extracted every patient in the MarketScan Medicaid Multi-State Database (MDCD) with
a diagnosis of atrial fibrillation, one year of observation time prior to the diagnosis, and one year of
observation time following the diagnosis.
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Figure 5: Stroke data. Comparison between our method and private/non-private ERM, for
different tot ∈ {0.5, 1, 2, 4}. For the non-private methods, non-private BLR (black square
marker) and ERM (black circle marker) achieved a similar AUC, which is higher than
AUC obtained by any other private methods. Our method (red) under BLR with moments
accountant with δ = 0.0001 achieved the highest AUCs regardless of tot among all the other
private methods. The private version of ERM (objective perturbation, green) performed
worse than BRL with strong composition as well as BRL with moments accountant. While
directly comparing these to the private ERM is not totally fair since the private ERM
(pERM) is -DP while others are (, δ)-DP, we show the difference between them in order
to contrast the relative gain of our method compared to the existing method.
Figure 6: Schematic of the sigmoid belief net-
work. A vector of binary observation y =
[y1, · · · , yJ ] is a function of a vector of binary
latent variables z = [z1, · · · , zK ] and model pa-
rameters such that p(yj = 1|z,θ) = σ(wj>z +
cj). The latent variables are also binary such
that p(zk = 1|θ) = σ(bk), where θ = {w, c,b}.
latent
variables
model
parameters
observed
variables
the nth observation and latent variables is given by
p(Dn, ln|m) = p(Dn|ln,m)p(ln|m),
=
J∏
j=1
σ(wj
>zn + cj)
K∏
k=1
σ(bk), (53)
=
J∏
j=1
[exp(wj
>zn + cj)]yn,j
1 + exp(wj>zn + cj)
K∏
k=1
[exp(bk)]
zn,k
1 + exp(bk)
, (54)
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where we view the latent variables ln = zn and model parameters m = θ, and each
datapoint Dn = yn.
Thanks to the Po´lya-Gamma data augmentation strategy, we can rewrite the complete-
data likelihood from
p(zn,yn|θ) =
J∏
j=1
[exp(ψn,j)]
yn,j
1 + exp(ψn,j)
K∏
k=1
[exp(bk)]
zn,k
1 + exp(bk)
, (55)
where we denote ψn,j = wj
>zn + cj , to
p(yn, zn|ξ(0)n , ξ(1),θ) ∝
J∏
j=1
exp((yn,j − 12)ψn,j) exp(−
ξ
(0)
n,jψ
2
n,j
2 )
K∏
k=1
exp((zn,k − 12)bk) exp(−
ξ
(1)
k b
2
k
2 )
where each element of vectors ξ
(0)
i ∈ RJ and ξ(1) ∈ RK is from PG(1, 0).
Using the notations ψn ∈ RJ where ψn = Wzn + c, W = [w1, · · · ,wJ ]> ∈ RJ×K , and
1J is a vector of J ones, we obtain
p(yn, zn|ξ(0)n , ξ(1),θ) ∝ exp
[
(yn − 121J)>ψn − 12ψn>diag(ξ(0)n )ψn + (zn − 121K)>b− 12b>diag(ξ(1))b
]
.
The complete-data likelihood given the PG variables provides the exponential family form
p(yn, zn|ξ(0)n , ξ(1),θ) (56)
∝ exp[(yn − 121J)>(Wzn + c)− 12(Wzn + c)>diag(ξ(0)n )(Wzn + c)
+ (zn − 121K)>b− 12b>diag(ξ(1))b], (57)
∝ exp[n(θ)>s(yn, zn, ξ(0)n , ξ(1))], (58)
where the natural parameters and sufficient statistics are given by
n(θ) =

b
−12vec(bb>)
c
−12vec(cc>)
−12vec(diag(c)W )
vec(W )
−12vec(vec(W>)vec(W>)>)

, s(yn, zn, ξ
(0)
n , ξ
(1)) =

zn − 121K
vec(diag(ξ(1)))
yn − 121J
vec(diag(ξ
(0)
n ))
vec(ξ
(0)
n zn
>)
vec(zn(yn − 121J)>)
vec(diag(ξ
(0)
n )⊗ (znzn>))

.
Now the PG variables form a set of sufficient statistics, which is separated from the
model parameters. Similar to logistic regression, in the E-step, we compute the posterior
over ξ and z, and output perturbed expected sufficient statistics. The closed-form update
of the posteriors over the PG variables is simply
q(ξ(0)n ) =
J∏
j=1
q(ξ
(0)
n,j) =
J∏
j=1
PG(1,
√
〈(wj>zn + cj)2〉q(θ)q(zn)), (59)
q(ξ(1)) =
K∏
k=1
q(ξ
(1)
k ) =
K∏
k=1
PG(1,
√
〈b2k〉q(θ)). (60)
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Algorithm 6 VIPS for sigmoid belief networks
Input: Data D. Define ρt = (τ0 + t)−κ, mini-batch size S, maximum iterations T , and σ
Output: Privatised expected natural parameters ˜¯n and expected sufficient statistics ˜¯s
for t = 1, . . . , T do
(1) E-step: Given expected natural parameters n¯, compute q(ξ
(0)
n ) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Given n¯, compute q(ξ(1)) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Given n¯, q(ξ
(0)
n ) and q(ξ(1)), compute q(zn) for n = 1, . . . , S.
Perturb s¯ = 1S
∑S
n=1〈s(Dn, ξ(0)n , ξ(1))〉q(ξ(0)n )q(ξ(1))q(z) by Appendix B, and output ˜¯s.
Update the moments function.
(2) M-step: Given ˜¯s, compute q(m) by ν˜(t) = ν+N ˜¯s. Set ν˜(t) ←[ (1−ρt)ν˜(t−1)+ρtν˜(t).
Using ν˜(t), update variational posteriors for hyper-priors by Appendix C, and output
˜¯n = 〈m〉q(m).
end for
The posterior over the latent variables is given by
q(z) =
N∏
n=1
K∏
k=1
q(zn,k) = Bern(σ(dn,k)), (61)
dn,k = 〈bk〉q(θ) + 〈wk>yn〉q(θ) − 12
J∑
j=1
(〈wj,k〉q(θ) + 〈ξ(0)n,j〉q(ξ)[2〈ψ\kn,jwj,k〉q(θ)q(z) + 〈w2j,k〉q(θ)]),
ψ
\k
n,j = wj
>zn − wj,kzn,k + cj . (62)
Now, using q(z) and q(ξ), we compute the expected sufficient statistics,
s¯(D) =

s¯1 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s1(yn)
s¯2 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s2(yn)
s¯3 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s3(yn)
s¯4 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s4(yn)
s¯5 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s5(yn)
s¯6 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s6(yn)
s¯7 =
1
N
∑N
n=1 s7(yn)

, where

s1(yn)
s2(yn)
s3(yn)
s4(yn)
s5(yn)
s6(yn)
s7(yn)

=

〈zn〉 − 121K
vec(diag(〈ξ(1)〉))
yn − 121J
vec(diag(〈ξ(0)n 〉))
vec(〈ξ(0)n 〉〈zn〉>)
vec(〈zn〉(yn − 121J)>)
vec(diag(〈ξ(0)n 〉)⊗ (〈znzn>〉))

.
Using the variational posterior distributions in the E-step, we perturb and output these
sufficient statistics. See Appendix B for the sensitivities of each of these sufficient statistics.
Note that when using the subsampled data per iteration, the sensitivity analysis has to be
modified as now the query is evaluated on a smaller dataset. Hence, the 1/N factor has to
be changed to 1/S.
Note that the fact that each of these sufficient statistics has a different sensitivity makes
it difficult to directly use the composibility theorem of the moments accountant method
(Abadi et al., 2016). To resolve this, we modify the sufficient statistic vector into a new
vector with a fixed sensitivity, and then apply the Gaussian mechanism. In this case, the
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log-moments are additive since the Gaussian noise added to the modified vector of sufficient
statistics given each subsampled data is independent, and hence we are able to perform the
usual moments accountant composition. Finally, we recover an estimate of the sufficient
statistics from the perturbed modified vector.
In more detail, let us denote the sensitivities of each vector quantities by C1, · · · , C7.
Further, denote the moments accountant noise parameter by σ, and the subsampled data
by Dq with sampling rate q. We first scale down each sufficient statistic vector by its own
sensitivity, so that the concatenated vector (denoted by s′ below)’s sensitivity becomes
√
7.
Then, add the standard normal noise to the vectors with scaled standard deviation,
√
7σ.
We then scale up each perturbed quantities by its own sensitivity, given as
s˜1(Dq)
s˜2(Dq)
s˜3(Dq)
s˜4(Dq)
s˜5(Dq)
s˜6(Dq)
s˜7(Dq)

=

C1s˜
′
1
C2s˜
′
2
C3s˜
′
3
C4s˜
′
4
C5s˜
′
5
C6s˜
′
6
C7s˜
′
7

where s˜′ = s′ +
√
7σN (0, I), (63)
where the ith chunk of the vector s is s′i = s¯i/Ci, resulting in privatized sufficient statistics.
While any conjugate priors are acceptable, following Gan et al. (2015), we put a Three
Parameter Beta Normal (TPBN) prior for W
Wj,k ∼ N (0, ζj,k), ζj,k ∼ Gam(12 , ξj,k), ξj,k ∼ Gam(12 , φk), φk ∼ Gam(0.5, ω), ω ∼ Gam(0.5, 1)
to induce sparsity, and isotropic normal priors for b and c: b ∼ N (0, νbIK), c ∼ N (0, νcIJ),
assuming these hyperparameters are set such that the prior is broad. The M-step updates
for the variational posteriors for the parameters as well as for the hyper-parameters are given
in Appendix C. It is worth noting that these posterior updates for the hyper-parameters are
one step away from the data, meaning that the posterior updates for the hyper-parameters
are functions of variational posteriors that are already perturbed due to the perturbations
in the expected natural parameters and expected sufficient statistics. Hence, we do not
need any additional perturbation in the posteriors for the hyper-parameters.
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Figure 7: Prediction accuracy (binarised version of MNIST dataset). The non-private
version (NP in black) achieves highest prediction accuracy under the SBN model with
K = 100. The private versions (moments accountant : MA (in red), and strong composition
: SC (in blue)) with σ = 1 and K = 100 resulted in a total privacy loss tot = 2.3468 when
the mini-batch size is S = 400, and tot = 2.398 for S = 800, tot = 3.2262 for S = 1600, and
tot = 4.8253 for S = 3200. We ran these algorithms until they see the total training data,
resulting in different numbers of iterations for each minibatch size. The private version
using strong composition (blue) performs worse than that using moments accountant (red)
regardless of the size of mini-batches, since the level of additive noise per iteration in strong
composition is higher than that in moments accountant.
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7.1 Experiments with MNIST data
We tested our VIPS algorithm for the SBN model on the MNIST digit dataset which
contains 60,000 training images of ten handwritten digits (0 to 9), where each image consists
of 28×28 pixels. For our experiment, we considered a one-hidden layer SBN with 100 hidden
unitsK = 100.7 We varied the mini-batch size S = {400, 800, 1600, 3200}. For a fixed σ = 1,
we obtained two different values of privacy loss due to different mini-batch sizes. We ran
our code until it sees the entire training data (60, 000). We tested the non-private version
of VIPS as well as the private versions with strong and moments accountant compositions,
where each algorithm was tested in 10 independent runs with different seed numbers.
As a performance measure, we calculated the pixel-wise prediction accuracy by first
converting the pixels of reconstructed images into probabilities (between 0 and 1); then
converting the probabilities into binary variables; and averaging the squared distances be-
tween the predicted binary variables and the test images. In each seed number, we selected
100 randomly selected test images from 10, 000 test datapoints. Fig. 7 shows the perfor-
mance of each method in terms of prediction accuracy.
8. Discussion
We have developed a practical privacy-preserving VB algorithm which outputs accurate and
privatized expected sufficient statistics and expected natural parameters. Our approach
uses the moments accountant analysis combined with the privacy amplification effect due
to subsampling of data, which significantly decrease the amount of additive noise for the
same expected privacy guarantee compared to the standard analysis. Our methods show
how to perform variational Bayes inference in private settings, not only for the conjugate
exponential family models but also for non-conjugate models with binomial likelihoods using
the Polya´ Gamma data augmentation. We illustrated the effectiveness of our algorithm on
several real-world datasets.
The private VB algorithms for the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), Bayesian Logistic
Regression (BLR), and Sigmoid Belief Network (SBN) models we discussed are just a few
examples of a much broader class of models to which our private VB framework applies. Our
positive empirical results with VB indicate that these ideas are also likely to be beneficial
for privatizing many other iterative machine learning algorithms. In future work, we plan
to apply this general framework to other inference methods for larger and more complicated
models such as deep neural networks. More broadly, our vision is that practical privacy
preserving machine learning algorithms will have a transformative impact on the practice
of data science in many real-world applications.
7. We chose this number since when K is larger than 100, the variational lower bound on the test data,
shown in Figure 2 in (Gan et al., 2015), does not increase significantly.
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Appendix A : Variational lower bound with auxiliary variables
The variational lower bound (per-datapoint for simplicity) given by
Ln(q(m), q(ln)) =
∫
q(m)q(ln) log
p(Dn|ln,m)p(m)p(ln)
q(m)q(ln)
dlndm , (64)
=
∫
q(m)q(ln) log p(Dn|ln,m)dlndm −DKL(q(m)||p(m))−DKL(q(ln)||p(ln)),
where the first term can be re-written using Eq. 28,∫
q(m)q(ln) log p(Dn|ln,m)dlndm = −b log 2 + (yn − b2)〈ln〉q(ln)>〈m〉q(m)
+
∫
q(m)q(ln) log
∫ ∞
0
exp(−12ξnln>mm>ln)p(ξn)dξn.
We rewrite the third term using q(ξn), the variational posterior distribution for ξn,∫
q(m)q(ln) log
∫ ∞
0
exp(−12ξnln>mm>ln)p(ξn)dξn
=
∫
q(m)q(ln) log
∫ ∞
0
q(ξn) exp(−12ξnln>mm>ln)
p(ξn)
q(ξn)
dξn,
≥
∫
q(m)q(ln)
∫ ∞
0
q(ξn)
[
(−12ξnln>mm>ln) + log
p(ξn)
q(ξn)
]
dξn,
= −12〈ξn〉q(ξn)〈ln>mm>ln〉q(ln)q(m) −DKL(q(ξn)||p(ξn)), (65)
which gives us a lower lower bound to the log likelihood,
Ln(q(m), q(ln)) ≥ Ln(q(m), q(ln), q(ξn)) (66)
:= −b log 2 + (yn − b2)〈ln〉q(ln)>〈m〉q(m) − 12〈ξn〉q(ξn)〈ln>mm>ln〉q(ln)q(m),
−DKL(q(ξn)||p(ξn))−DKL(q(m)||p(m))−DKL(q(ln)||p(ln)),
which implies that∫
q(m)q(ln)q(ξn) log p(Dn|ln, ξn,m)
= −b log 2 + (yn − b2)〈ln〉q(ln)>〈m〉q(m) − 12〈ξn〉q(ξn)〈ln>mm>ln〉q(ln)q(m). (67)
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Appendix B : Perturbing expected sufficient statistics in SBNs
Using the variational posterior distributions in the E-step, we perturb and output each
sufficient statistic as follows. Note that the 1/N factor has to be changed to 1/S when
using the subsampled data per iteration.
• For perturbing s¯1, we perturb A = 1N
∑N
n=1〈zn〉 where the sensitivity is given by
∆A = max
|D\D′|=1
|A(D)−A(D′)|2,
≤ max
yn,q(zn)
1
N
√√√√ K∑
k=1
(σ(dn,k))2 ≤
√
K
N
, (68)
due to Eq. 16 and the fact that zn is a vector of Bernoulli random variables (length
K) and the mean of each element is σ(dn,k) as given in Eq. 61.
• For perturbing ˜¯s2, we perturb B = 〈ξ(1)〉, i.e. the part before we apply the diag and
vec operations. The sensitivity of B is given by ∆B ≤
√
K
4 as shown in Fig. 4.
• For perturbing s¯3, we perturb C = 1N
∑N
n=1 yn, where the sensitivity is given by
∆C = max
|D\D′|=1
|C(D)− C(D′)|2 = max
yn
1
N |yn|2 ≤
√
J
N , (69)
since yn is a binary vector of length J . Note that when performing the batch optimi-
sation, we perturb s¯3 only once, since this quantity remains the same across iterations.
However, when performing the stochastic optimisation, we perturb s¯3 in every itera-
tion, since the new mini-batch of data is selected in every iteration.
• For perturbing ˜¯s4, we perturb D = 1N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n 〉, which is once again the part before
taking diag and vec operations. Due to Eq. 16, the sensitivity is given by
∆D = max
|D\D′|=1
|D(D)−D(D′)|2 ≤
√
J
4N
. (70)
• For ˜¯s5, we perturb E = 1N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n 〉〈zn〉> . From Eq. 16, the sensitivity is given by
∆E = max
|D\D′|=1
|E(D)− E(D′)|2,
≤ max
yn,q(zn),q(ξn)
1
N
√√√√ K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
(〈ξ(0)n,j〉〈zn,k〉)2 ≤
√
JK
4N
. (71)
• For ˜¯s6, we can use the noisy ˜¯s1 for the second term, but perturb only the first term
F = 1N
∑N
n=1 yn〈zn〉>. Due to Eq. 16, the sensitivity is given by
∆F = max
|D\D′|=1
|F (D)− F (D′)|2,
≤ max
yn,q(zn)
1
N
√√√√ K∑
k=1
J∑
j=1
(yn,j〈zn,k〉)2 ≤
√
JK
N
. (72)
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• For s¯7, we define a matrix G, which is a collection of J matrices where each matrix is
Gj =
1
N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n,j〉〈znzn>〉, where Gj ∈ RK×K .
Using Eq. 16, the sensitivity of Gj is given by
∆Gj = max|D\D′|=1
|Gj(D)−Gj(D′)|2,
≤ max
yn
1
N
√√√√ K∑
k=1
K∑
k′=1
(〈ξ(0)n,j〉〈zn,kzn,k〉)2 ≤ K4N , (73)
which gives us the sensitivity of ∆G ≤
√
JK
4N .
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Appendix C: M-step updates in SBNs
The M-step updates are given below (taken from (Gan et al., 2015)):
• q(W ) = ∏Jj=1 q(wj), and q(wj) = N (µj ,Σj), where
Σj =
[
N∑
n=1
〈ξ(0)n,j〉q(ξ)〈znzn>〉+ diag(〈ζ−1j 〉q(ζ))
]−1
µj = Σj
[
N∑
n=1
(yn,j − 12 − 〈cj〉q(θ)〈ξ
(0)
n,j〉q(ξ))〈zn〉q(z)
]
.
where we replace 1N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n,j〉q(ξ)〈znzn>〉, 1N
∑N
n=1 yn,j〈zn〉q(z), 1N
∑N
n=1〈zn〉q(z), and
1
N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n,j〉q(ξ)〈zn〉q(z), with perturbed expected sufficient statistics.
• q(b) = N (µb,Σb), where
Σb =
[
1
νb
I +Ndiag(〈ξ(1)〉)
]−1
, (74)
µb = Σb
[
N∑
n=1
(〈zn〉 − 1
2
1K)
]
, (75)
where we replace 〈ξ(1)〉 and 1N
∑N
n=1〈zn〉q(z) with perturbed expected sufficient statis-
tics.
• q(c) = N (µc,Σc), where
Σc =
[
1
νc
I + diag(
N∑
n=1
〈ξ(0)n 〉)
]−1
, (76)
µc = Σc
[
N∑
n=1
(yn
> − 1
2
1J
> − 1
2
diag(〈ξ(0)n 〉〈zn〉>〈W 〉>))
]
, (77)
where we replace 1N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n 〉, 1N
∑N
n=1 yn, and
1
N
∑N
n=1〈ξ(0)n 〉〈zn〉> with perturbed
expected sufficient statistics.
• TPBN shrinkage priors:
q(ζj,k) = GIG(0, 2〈ξj,k〉q(ξ), 〈w2j,k〉q(θ)), q(ξj,k) = Gam(1, 〈ζj,k〉q(ζ))
q(φk) = Gam(
J
2 +
1
2 , 〈ω〉q(ω) +
J∑
j=1
〈ξj,k〉q(ξ)), q(ω) = Gam(K2 + 12 , 1 +
K∑
k=1
〈φk〉q(φ)).
When updating these TPBN shrinkage priors, we first calculate q(ζj,k) using a data-
independent initial value for 2〈ξj,k〉q(ξ) and perturb 〈w2j,k〉q(θ) (since q(c) is perturbed).
Using this perturbed q(ζj,k), we calculate q(ξj,k). Then, using q(ξj,k), we calculate
q(φk) with some data-independent initial value for 〈ω〉q(ω). Then, finally, we update
q(ω) using q(φk). In this way, these TPBN shrinkage priors are perturbed.
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Appendix D: The EM algorithm and its relationship to VBEM
In contrast to VBEM, which computes an approximate posterior distribution, EM finds a
point estimate of model parameters m . A derivation of EM from a variational perspective,
due to Neal and Hinton (1998), shows that VBEM generalizes EM (Beal, 2003). To derive
EM from this perspective, we begin by identifying a lower bound L(q,m) on the log-
likelihood using another Jensen’s inequality argument, which will serve as a proxy objective
function. For any parameters m and auxiliary distribution over the latent variables q(l),
log p(D;m) = log
(∫
dl p(l ,D;m)q(l)
q(l)
)
= log
(
Eq
[p(l ,D;m)
q(l)
])
≥ Eq
[
log p(l ,D;m)− log q(l)
]
= Eq
[
log p(l ,D;m)
]
+H(q) , L(q,m). (78)
Note that L(q,m) has a very similar definition to the ELBO from VB (Eq. 6). Indeed,
we observe that for an instance of VBEM where q(m) is restricted to being a Dirac delta
function at m , q(m) = δ(m − m∗), and with no prior on m , we have L(q(l),m) =
L(q(l ,m)) (Beal, 2003). The EM algorithm can be derived as a coordinate ascent algorithm
which maximises L(q,m) by alternatingly optimizing q (the E-step) and m (the M-step)
(Neal and Hinton, 1998). At iteration i, with current parameters m (i−1), the updates are:
q(i) = arg max
q
L(q,m (i−1)) = p(l |D;m (i−1)) (E-step)
m (i) = arg max
m
L(q(i),m) (M-step). (79)
In the above, arg maxq L(q,m (i−1)) = p(l |D;m (i−1)) since this maximisation is equivalent
to minimising DKL(q(l)‖p(l |D;m (i−1))). To see this, we rewrite L(q,m) as
L(q,m) = Eq
[
log p(l ,D;m)
]
− Eq[log q(l)]
= log p(D;m) + Eq
[
log p(l |D,m)
]
− Eq[log q(l)]
= log p(D;m)−DKL(q(l)‖p(l |m ,D)) . (80)
From a VBEM perspective, the M-step equivalently finds the Dirac delta q(m) which max-
imises L(q(l ,m)). Although we have derived EM as optimizing the variational lower bound
L(q,m) in each E- and M-step, it can also be shown that it monotonically increases the
log-likelihood log p(D;m) in each iteration. The E-step selects q(i) = p(l |D;m (i−1)) which
sets the KL-divergence in Eq. 80 to 0 at m (i), at which point the bound is tight. This means
that log p(D;m (i−1)) is achievable in the bound, so maxm L(q(i),m) ≥ log p(D;m (i−1)). As
L(q,m) lower bounds the log likelihood at m , this in turn guarantees that the log-likelihood
is non-decreasing over the previous iteration. We can thus also interpret the E-step as com-
puting a lower bound on the log-likelihood, and the M-step as maximizing this lower bound,
i.e. an instance of the Minorise Maximise (MM) algorithm. EM is sometimes written in
terms of the expected complete data log-likelihood Q(m ;m (i−1)),
Q(m ;m (i−1)) = Ep(l |D;m(i−1))[log p(l ,D;m)] (E-step)
m (i) = arg max
m
Q(m ;m (i−1)) (M-step). (81)
This is equivalent to Eq. 79: Q(m ;m (i−1)) +H(p(l |D;m (i−1))) = L(p(l |D;m (i−1)),m).
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